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Bolivia, overshadowed by its much larger and wealthier 
neighbors such as Chile, Brazil, Argentina and Peru, is one 
of those small countries that rarely make the world news. 
This changed in December 2005, however, when a relative 
newcomer to Bolivian electoral politics, Evo Morales, was 
elected to the presidency with a majority of the popular vote. 
He immediately embarked on a world tour and was warmly 
received, not only by Fidel Castro (his ﬁrst port of call) but in 
many Latin American and European capitals, as well as Asia 
and Africa, where he was greeted as the world’s ﬁrst “indig-
enous president.”
This world tour had a remarkable effect on Bolivia’s global 
image: pictures of poverty and unrest were replaced by the 
charismatic face of a man conﬁdent enough to ignore sarto-
rial protocol by wearing an Andean sweater and proletarian 
shoes to meet presidents and kings. Millions of dollars of 
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investment followed, adding to the invaluable propaganda 
coup. Around the world people who could not name a single 
Bolivian president can now pronounce the name of Evo, no 
small feat for a man who had been shunned by the Bolivian 
political establishment and labeled by the U.S. Ambassador as 
a “narcoterrorist.”
Evo Morales’ election represents profound and dramatic 
changes in the social and political landscape of Bolivia. Some 
have heralded his election as a major social revolution. It is 
certainly the case that for the ﬁrst time since the Conquest in-
digenous people have a signiﬁcant measure of ofﬁcial political 
power in a country of the Americas. Morales’ election is much 
more than the election of a new leader; it is a major change in 
how state power is wielded in a country where whites, be they 
Spanish colonists or their creole descendants, have ruled over 
a majority indigenous population for ﬁve centuries. This has 
consequences for how power is exercised at the political level 
but also at the micro level; it has consequences for people’s 
sense of who they are as Bolivians and as indigenous people; 
and it has consequences in the more intimate spaces of people’s 
lives. These are some of the themes explored in the essays of 
this volume. 
In this introductory essay I sketch the background that 
led up to Morales’ election and the multifarious social and 
political forces behind it. Some of these go back to the time 
of Conquest, and others are rooted in the pragmatics of 21st 
century politics.
Revolt and Revolution
Although Bolivia includes large tracts of lowland rainfor-
est and drier plain, for most of its history the majority of the 
population has been settled in the high Andean region. Not only 
did the mountains offer rich agricultural land that sustained 
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civilizations such as Tiwanaku and the Inka Empire, but the 
Andes are also rich in such minerals as silver and gold as well 
as copper, tin and many other minerals. For centuries the area 
that is now Bolivia was dominated by mining interests (whether 
they be Inkaic, colonial or republican), interests that depended 
on the labor of a large indigenous peasantry. Then and now 
these peasants principally speak Quechua (the language of the 
Inkas) and Aymara, as well as a number of other languages 
such as Chipaya and Guaraní. 
There are obvious discontinuities between the Inkaic and 
colonial periods, but there are also important elements that 
traverse the timeline: whereas the elites changed from indi-
geneous Americans to Europeans, the mass of the population 
continued to live as peasants and miners. Agricultural and 
mining techniques in many areas changed relatively little 
through the centuries. 
By the middle of the 20th century the majority of the 
population continued to be rural-dwelling indigenous peas-
ants. Some lived in haciendas where they were, in effect, serfs; 
others lived in free communities which provided much of the 
labor for the mines that fueled the country’s export economy. 
A small white elite continued to dominate economic and po-
litical institutions. 
This changed dramatically with the 1952 Revolution that 
overthrew the landowning oligarchy and ushered in a period 
of major social transformation. Agrarian reform returned land 
to indigenous peasants, education reform initiated the con-
struction of schools all over the countryside, suffrage became 
universal, and the political class came to be dominated by ur-
ban mestizos (people of notionally mixed descent) and whites 
not aligned with the traditional oligarchy. Indigenous people, 
although they supported the revolution and were instrumental 
in its success, were not given formal recognition as a group, 
nor were they represented in positions of power. Instead they 
were co-opted into the state system through a hierarchical 
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system of peasants’ unions. As the Revolution moved to ban 
the word “Indian” and replace it with “peasant” (campesino), 
the ethnic or racial aspect of the peasant class (not to mention 
their urban kin) was erased by ﬁat.
Bolivia’s 1952 Revolution was one of the most far-reaching 
in Latin American history and, with the exception of the Cuban 
Revolution, the one with the most profound social consequenc-
es, especially in the area of land reform. Despite its import, 
succeeding decades saw a whittling down of the progressive 
thrust of the Revolution and by the 1970s Bolivia was under a 
military dictatorship where any kind of political opposition or 
protest was liable to severe repression. The political oppression 
also served to obscure the subterranean shifts that were build-
ing up pressure that would break in the future. 
For a generation of Bolivians, 1952 was the anti-colonial 
moment; from the point of view of Indians, Bolivian indepen-
dence in 1825 had merely transferred rule from one white elite 
group to another. In fact, some aspects of the new republic 
exacerbated colonial exploitation: whereas the Crown offered 
some protection to free Indian communities in order to ensure 
that they continued to pay taxes to the colonial state (hacienda 
Indians being exempt), the new liberal republic assailed the 
notion and the practice of communal land ownership and the 
succeeding decades saw the greatest dispossession of Indian 
lands since the Conquest. It was the Revolution in 1952 and 
the Agrarian Reform the following year that returned land to 
Indians, an event that for many people marks the end of “Span-
ish” domination, the true anticolonial moment.
There can be no doubt of the political and social signiﬁcance 
of the revolutionary years and the profound transformations 
it ushered in: by the end of the century mestizos (the term de-
notes a cultural orientation as much as it does putative mixed 
ancestry) had become prominent in many walks of life of a 
much more urban nation. 
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The progressive social and political reforms of the Revolu-
tion diminished in force and scope as military dictatorships 
took control from 1970 until 1982. The following decade saw 
hyperinﬂation that reputedly broke world records, succeeded 
by a Jeffrey Sachs-designed structural adjustment that shook 
the nation via the wholesale privatization of state industries 
(including, most importantly, the mines), and severe ﬁscal 
tightening. As is usually the case with “shock therapy,” the 
poorest sectors suffered most, and in this case their difﬁcul-
ties were exacerbated by a severe drought that pushed many 
highland people, such as future president Evo Morales, to large 
cities or to eastern valleys where there were better prospects 
cultivating coca, an industry that had expanded rapidly under 
the military regime. 
As the century drew to a close amid celebrations and 
protests of the quatricentenary of European “discovery” of 
America, people increasingly thought and talked about the 1952 
Revolution as incomplete. Yes, the peasantry was free, Indians 
no longer had a different legal status than whites and mestizos, 
and there was universal adult suffrage; yet, it was equally clear 
that most indigenous people were not enjoying positions of 
power or inﬂuence after 400 years of colonial rule.
The belief that Indians would disappear in the face of mod-
ernization began to erode in the 1990s, and signiﬁcant symbolic 
gestures were made towards the idea of a multicultural Bolivia. 
As the century drew to a close, however, traditional political 
classes still clung to state power, apparently unaware of the 
depths of the discontent that was developing.
Revolution Redux
 Social and political pressures started to build in the last 
decades of the previous century around areas of tension such 
as migration and urban expansion. Since the 1952 Revolution, 
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indigenous people have been migrating to cities in massive 
numbers. The city of El Alto, adjacent to the capital, La Paz, 
was nothing more than a few farming homesteads in the early 
1970s. According to the 2001 census the population stands at 
650,000, not much smaller than La Paz itself, at 800,000. 
Rapid urbanization, of course, is not unique to Bolivia. What 
is signiﬁcant about the Bolivian experience is the increasing pro-
pensity for urban residents to identify as indigenous. Twenty 
years ago it could safely be assumed that urban migrants were 
following the pattern of previous generations and becoming 
mestizos. Even into the 1990s few people in towns and cities 
identiﬁed themselves as indigenous or even as Aymaras and 
Quechuas; Aymara and Quechua were principally used to 
refer to languages people might speak, not ethnic or national 
designations. 
Yet today, the majority of the residents of El Alto over-
whelmingly identify as indigenous (as does half of La Paz’s 
population). El Alto became famous for its well-organized pro-
tests that helped bring Morales to power. These recent migrants 
or children of migrants live between the Aymara-speaking 
agricultural world of their parents or grandparents dominated 
by community life and ritual, and the Spanish-speaking world 
of schooled but underemployed people struggling to make a 
living. Their experiences and frustrations are shared by many 
other urban and semi-urban people in Bolivia. 
Another important sector is that composed of coca grow-
ers. Coca growers share much with the new urban populations 
of Bolivia: they are displaced people living in between the 
rooted agricultural world of their parents and places where 
communities have to be created in a much more moneterized 
world with high consumption values. If one add the fact that 
coca growers suffer sustained and often violent repression, it 
is not surprising that they became politically organized and 
motivated. Their interests are not, however, obviously aligned 
with city migrants or the traditional peasantry and, in fact, 
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there has been profound animosity between urban and rural 
Aymara people in the area of La Paz and the predominantly 
Quechua-speaking coca growers led by Evo Morales. They 
were, nevertheless, opposed to many state policies and a po-
litical system that excluded indigenous people.
Politics during this period of rapid social change were 
dominated by three parties that alternated power: the Mov-
imiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (Revolutionary Nationalist 
Movement which was the party that led the 1952 Revolution; 
the Acción Democrática Nacionalista (Nationalist Democratic 
Action); and the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario (Move-
mente of the Revolutionary Left). ADN and MIR twice shared 
power in coalition. 
Despite two of the parties having “revolutionary” in their 
titles, all three presided over a liberalizing of the Bolivian 
economy: workers’ rights were eroded; state assets were sold 
off to foreign investors; trade deals were struck allowing com-
petitive imports to undermine Bolivian producers; and, more 
than ever, Bolivians were exposed to the vagaries of world 
markets. Moreover, politics on the national level continued 
to be controlled by a white social and economic elite. As a 
consequence, peasants and, increasingly, urban people, began 
organizing new movements in protest against the state and 
political parties that marginalized them. For much of the 1980s 
and 1990s these opposition groups were largely politically ir-
relevant and particularly prone to inﬁghting. During this time 
they were increasingly organizing not only as peasants, miners, 
and coca growers, but as indigenous people. 
The emergence of new kinds of indigenous identity was one 
of a number of factors that combined to expose the weakness 
of the state and the party political system, leading to increas-
ing outright challenge to the state. In April 2000 there began a 
“Water War” in the city of Cochabamba around the sale of water 
resources in the region to a multinational company, Bechtel. 
The Coordinadora de Agua was principally led by middle class 
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residents of the city who quickly managed to form a robust 
coalition that included urban residents (middle as well as 
working class) and small- and large-scale water users from 
the surrounding area. 
During the two years of unrest before Bechtel quit Coch-
abamba, the language of protest became increasingly reﬁned: 
it invoked indigenous imagery with greater frequency and 
also represented itself with the language of a protest against 
globalization. The Water War won support from other parts 
of the country, notably from the coca growers under Evo Mo-
rales’ leadership, and from peasants in the highlands around 
La Paz where the Aymara leader, Felipe Quispe, successfully 
blockaded the capital city several times. 
The demands expressed by these sectors were no longer 
speciﬁcally about water in Cochabamba but about broader 
issues to do with political neglect, corruption, marginaliza-
tion, poverty, and the exploitation of natural resources. These 
concerns were increasingly expressed in terms of an historical 
injustice, a direct consequence of European colonization. 
Evo Morales’ coca growers were, at least initially, concerned 
with the more speciﬁc issues of coca eradication policies, es-
pecially those implemented under the presidency of former 
dictator Hugo Bánzer who was elected in 1997, rather than 
broader social or political issues. Under shrill pressure from 
the U.S. embassy, Banzer’s successors in power (Tito Quiroga 
of his AND party and Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada of the MNR) 
similarly pursued vigorous and violent policies against the 
coca growers causing numerous deaths. It is worth recalling 
that at this time Evo Morales was known domestically as the 
leader of the coca-growers and not as an indigenous leader as 
such; internationally, he was becoming aware of the virtues of 
being recognized as an indigenous leader.
Tensions continued to rise through the presidential elections 
in 2002, not least because Evo Morales gained the second largest 
number of votes. His surprising result was in part due to the 
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unexpected boost given him by the U.S. Ambassador’s calling 
him a “narcoterrorist” and threatening to withhold aid from 
Bolivia should the population elect Morales. This undiplomatic 
threat in the context of an election so incensed Bolivian opinion 
that it gave Morales increasing support, a fact he himself has 
readily acknowledged.
Sánchez de Lozada won the presidential election with 
little over a quarter of the popular vote. He nevertheless acted 
boldly to sell Bolivian gas to a California-based corporation via 
a Chilean reﬁnery. The subsequent “Gas War” as it came to be 
known was supported by large sectors of the population, such 
as miners, urban groups, leftists, coca growers, peasants, and 
intellectuals for whom it became a proxy issue around which 
to protest the distance of government from the people, the loss 
of national sovereignty, and more generalized hostility towards 
the United States and global capitalism. Increasingly diverse 
issues came to be represented in terms of a broad indigenous 
political sensibility, a political umbrella that was far broader 
and much more ambitious than historically deﬁned indigenous 
issues such as land rights or identity politics. Indigeneity was 
developing into a political positioning and a powerful one at 
that.
Matters came to a head in “Black October” 2003 when the 
army killed 60 unarmed protestors and the nation erupted 
in protest against the government. Sánchez de Lozada was 
branded a murderer and ﬂed to the United States, which gave 
him sanctuary and refused to extradite him to stand trial. His 
vice president held onto power until the following year when 
elections were held and Evo Morales won with a clear and 
unprecedented majority of the vote. It was the ﬁrst time in 
modern history that a single candidate received anything close 
to a majority of the votes cast for Bolivian president. 
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A New Revolution
The 2005 election has been seen by many in Bolivia and 
elsewhere as completing the 1952 Revolution. If the latter was 
fought by Indians but led by mestizos and whites, the former 
was overwhelmingly directed by indigenous people; moreover, 
indigenous people were assertive and conﬁdent in their indige-
neity. The principal pillars of the 1952 Revolution (land reform 
and education) together turned the monolingual indigenous 
majority into a predominantly urban and Spanish-speaking 
people. Yet contrary to expectations, many of these people do 
not closely identify with or assimilate to the mores and aspira-
tions of the white middle and upper classes.
It is among these sectors that Evo Morales ﬁnds his most 
solid base. His reforms are directed at improving their health 
and their children’s access to schools. He also articulates a sense 
of national pride, more speciﬁcally an indigenous national 
pride, that helps bolster people against the cruelties of class 
discrimination within Bolivia and harsh exposure to global 
processes. 
Evo Morales is not simply an indigenous ﬁgurehead or a 
successful politician who just happens to be indigenous: there 
is an overwhelming indigenous presence in the cabinet and 
ministries; and for the ﬁrst time since the 16th century indig-
enous people in Bolivia formally control the state, albeit a no-
toriously weak one. This certainly makes for political tensions: 
not only does the old party elite resent its loss of power, but 
the large landowners in the eastern part of the country (an area 
that mostly escaped land reform) are pushing for increasing 
autonomy from the state. This resource-rich part of the country 
continues to be governed by an elite which presents itself as 
white in contrast to the indigenous highlanders. At the time of 
this writing, constitutional reform is paralyzed largely because 
of intense maneuvering by departments arguing for increased 
autonomy, as well as controversies over the Supreme Court. In 
Canessa: INTRODUCTION: A  POSTCOLONIAL  TURN 155
many rural and urban areas the “Evo Effect” is being felt, not 
only in terms of more health and other resources to villages 
and poor urban areas, but in the presence of an optimism that 
positive change is possible. Many indigenous people see the 
president as one who is addressing their concerns.
It would be a mistake to see Morales’ success as a simple 
case of an indigenous majority taking power, not least because 
the wealth of the country has by no means changed hands. 
Morales’ skill lies in his ability to speak to the concerns of a 
people across a broad spectrum: leftists, peasants, industrial 
workers, recent migrants, those concerned about globalization 
and those seeking political change. The changes he is proposing 
are consequently both broad and profound and are prompting 
a widespread reevaluation of some of the basic ideas of what 
it means to be Bolivian.
This Volume
The papers in this volume explore various aspects of the 
changing social and political landscape of Bolivia. A key fea-
ture of the new political order is a change in traditional power 
relations. The model of the Indian either in a servile position 
to powerful people or violently opposing them has changed: 
it is indigenous people who now wield power. The phrase “in-
digenous people in power” represents a jarring contradiction 
with respect to the previous ﬁve centuries. Being an Indian has 
meant precisely being on the inferior side of a power relation-
ship; and for hundreds of years those Indians who acquired 
power were reclassiﬁed as mestizos. Indians historically have 
had access to power through patron-client relations where 
they are expected to act the role of the servile and sycophantic 
llunk’u. At the same time, as Albro notes in this volume, the 
llunk’u is stigmatized for kowtowing to the patron class and for 
being a shifty and mistrustful client. Calling someone a llunk’u 
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is a powerful insult and one of the worst that could be thrown 
at an indigenous politician because it implies a selling out of 
ethnic pride and an adoption of a colonial relationship. 
As Albro details, the stigma applied to the llunk’u serves 
as a means to criticize hierarchical relations as well as an as-
sertion of indigenous masculinity and integrity with which it 
contrasts. Problems arise, however, for the new indigenous 
political order that seeks to erase hierarchical relationships, 
especially those with an ethnic or racial tint to them, even as 
it presents itself as a worthy patron, in the form of the state, 
to its citizens. This is one of the many contradictions at the 
heart of Morales’ project as he attempts to overturn centuries-
old power relations rooted in racial and gendered modes of 
exercising power. Rockefeller, in his paper, confronts a similar 
paradox. Morales owes his success to the support of several 
social movements from different sectors of Bolivia’s population, 
and their support was rewarded with key posts in ministries 
of the state. However, many of these social movements are 
antagonistic towards the state and continue to agitate against 
it. For Rockefeller this is an example of Leninist-Trotskyite 
“dual power” inherent in many revolutionary situations. The 
concept of “dual power” is useful in understanding contem-
porary Bolivia because it underlines the revolutionary nature 
of the many demands made by the social movements and the 
delicate maneuvering Evo Morales and his government have 
to undergo to direct an effective state even as their supporters 
oppose it. Perhaps more signiﬁcantly is the fact that by includ-
ing the social movements within government, current powers 
can claim to represent the people of Bolivia in electoral terms 
and simultaneously claim to speak for the “masses” who, as 
recent history shows, are capable of mobilizing to bring down 
governments. The sources of the dual power can also therefore 
be seen as offering a double legitimacy.
One of the sources of Evo Morales’ legitimacy is his ability 
to speak for the indigenous people of Bolivia. This apparently 
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straightforward statement obscures an immensely complex set 
of positions and identities which come under “indigenous.” 
Morales has partly capitalized on and partly produced an 
expansion of indigenous identity in Bolivia. 
In the past, “Indian” was a word of abuse and never self-as-
cribed; and even as recently as 20 years ago, with the exception 
of a few intellectuals, few people in Bolivia used the term “in-
digenous” to refer to themselves. In the last census a majority 
of Bolivia’s population self-identiﬁed as indigenous, including 
large sections of the urban population. In his contribution, Ca-
nessa explores some of the contexts of this new and politically 
powerful identity, which in Bolivia has the capacity to unite 
a majority of the nation. He demonstrates that it can mean 
very different things to different people: indigenous symbols 
can be used in different and even contradictory ways; and the 
language of indigeneity used in urban areas and by indigenous 
politicians may be radically different to the way “obviously” 
indigenous people think of themselves. 
In his new Bolivian republic Morales is opening up the cor-
ridors of power not only to previously excluded indigenous 
people but to many other sectors of the population that have 
been excluded. Clearly inspired by the Zapatistas in Mexico, 
indigenists in Bolivia are drawing on their experiences as 
marginalized peoples to develop an indigenous positioning, a 
particular political stance from which to view the world. Due 
to their historical experiences, it is argued, indigenous people 
have privileged perspectives on issues relating to the environ-
ment, globalization and marginalization. Accordingly, they 
assert a kinship with oppressed groups everywhere: women, 
workers, racial and sexual minorities, and so on. To be sure, 
indigenous movements are by no means immune from sexism, 
racism and homophobia but the brand of indigeneity espoused 
by Morales (and Comandante Marcos of the Zapatistas) at-
tempts to reach out to a broad array of oppressed groups.
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Susan Paulson’s paper demonstrates how the personal is 
political in Bolivia and the ways in which family, kinship and 
citizenship are being re-imagined. Historically in Bolivia the 
(white) heterosexual family has been at the center of the imag-
ined nation and contained profound assumptions about female 
agency, employment, and sexual desire, among other things. 
The Indian family, in contrast, was deemed disturbingly prob-
lematic. The strength of women and their apparent disregard 
for modern housekeeping were issues that exercised the minds 
of politicians in the 20th century. Morales, as Rockefeller points 
out in this issue, is committed to refounding the Republic and 
opening up power to the previously disenfranchised. As Paul-
son shows, the Morales government has given women’s groups 
and sexual minorities unprecedented access to power and their 
voices are being heard as never before. This is not to say that 
forms of repression and discrimination have been abandoned 
but the indigenous revolution has opened the spaces to imagine 
a new Bolivia not only in terms of political power but also in 
terms of social relations, domestic arrangements, and a new 
intimate and political kinship. The publicly emerging forms 
of kinship and family that Paulson describes are much more 
than mere effects of a liberal environment. They draw on deep 
traditions of connection and collaboration that for some time 
were overshadowed by the hierarchical models of male-headed 
nuclear family, peasant union and political party. And, as these 
more modern structures erode, they contribute to discussions 
and formations of new kinds of social and political bonds.
As Canessa notes in his paper, the new indigenous position-
ing is as much a claim to justice as it is an assertion of ethnicity; 
and this claim to justice pulls a wide and laden net. Indeed, it 
would need to since Morales’ success draws on a broad group of 
quite diverse social groups united in their claims to justice. 
As constitutional reform falters and internal opposition 
builds against the government, it seems likely that the hopes 
with which the Morales administration was elected will not all 
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be realized. It is hard to imagine, however, that Bolivia will eas-
ily return to a situation in which the indigenous majority of the 
population was systematically excluded from power and taken 
for granted by political parties. Economic power continues to 
lie in the hands of a white elite but it is possible to believe that 
the country has indeed entered a postcolonial era.
